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To the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

Petitioners pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue
to r.eview the Judgment entered March 31, 1972 by
the Uunted States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
1

OPINIONS BELOW
The Judgment entered March 31, 1972 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reported at 458 F.2d 486 (1972) set forth in
Appendix I. It affirmed the Order of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia rendered January 13, 1972, reported at 336
F.Supp. 1275 (1972) and set forth in Appendix III.
JURISDICTION
Petition for Rehearing on the Judgment entered
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was denied May 2, 1972 and is set forth in
Appendix IL The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Can an order of the Distr ict Court which requires that the racial composition of elementary
schools be almost identical to the mathematical
ratio of the entire system contrary to Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
402 U.S. 1 (1971), Winston-Salem/Forsythe County Board of Education v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221
(1972) be allowed to stand?
2. To what extent is the increased transportation
of elementary students to achieve racial balance
constitutionally permissible?
3. Does Swann, supra, require a school system, previously operating pursuant to a desegregation
plan prepared by HEW and approved by the District Court, to immediately undergo massive busing without determining the feasibility of constitutionally acceptable, but less burdensome alternatives?
2

Data.

1. School Capacities:
Weed
Robinson
Merry

12 classrooms
16
22

2. Pupils presently transported:

300 pupils
400
550
122

Pupil Allocation Plan.
Weed
w
Grade
90
5

Robinson
Grade

B

W

6
7

53

-

B

90

55

92

57

-

182
112
294
38.1% B

143
37.0% B
Merry
Grade
w
72
1
2
75
78
3
91
4

316

B

70
52
46
39
207

523

39.6% B
Transportation Estimate.
Weed
To Merry --------------------------------------------------- 42
Robinson
To Merry ----------------------------------------------------- 161
A-49

Data.

·'

1. School Capacities:
500 pupils
750

20 classrooms
30

Craig
Hains

2. Total presently transported:
Pupil Allocation Plan.
Craig
B
w
Grade
112
60
1
49
114
2
54
117
3

343

0
Hains

Grade

W

B

4

126
127
129
111

51
47
56
45

493

199

5
6
7

163

4. Is the 1972. Education Amendments Act which restates a portion of § 407 (a) Civil Rights Act of
1964, forbidding Courts to order bussing for racial
balance, a Congressional expression that the interpretation of this language contained in Swann
is incorrect?
5. Is the 1972 Education Amendments Act a Congressional determination on how best to implement the 14th Amendment so as to withdraw
jurisdiction from the entire class of cases?
CONSTITUTION AL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves the following provisions of
the Constitution of the United States:

1. Article I, Section 8, Clause 18
(Necessary and Proper Clause)
2. Article III, Section 1 and 2
(Jurisdiction Clause)
3. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment
(Equal Protection Clause)
4. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment
(Enforcement Clause)

692
28.7% B

506

32.2% B
Transportation Estimates.
Craig to Hains ------------------------------------------- 189
Hains to Craig ------------------------------------------- 349
Total transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 538
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

STATEMENT

COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION

1. PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
(PRIOR TO 1970)

PLAN III ZONE G
Per Cent
Black 38.8%

Totals
By Race
School
W
B

Schools

Weed ___________________ _ 63
Robinson ________________ 40
Merry __________________ _ 485
Totals _________ 588
A-48

160
121
91
372

223
161
576
960

Petitioners are a class of parents who were granted intervention in 1971.1 At that juncture this case
1

Petitioners/Intervenors are Ann Gunter Drummond, Mason
Carter Clements, Mrs. S. Lee Wallace, Nadine Estroff, Douglas
D. Barnard, Jr., Robert Beattie, Bill Perry, Dr. James R. Hattaway, William J. Salley, Patrick G. Smith, C. Dan Cook, Earl
E. Hensley, William B. Kuhlke, Jr., George H. Streeter, George
W. Fisher, Freddie Childress, Leona Norton, H. Weldon Hair,
Howard W. Poteet.

3

was already seven years old having been commenced
in 1964 by black parents seeking to desegregate the
school system. This litigation has followed the evolution from "freedom of choice" in a pattern not dissimilar to other school districts.
Jurisdiction was assigned to the current District
Court Judge shortly after his appointment in 1968.
At a hearing held in December of that year the
school board was directed to prepare a desegregation plan based on geographical zones and attendance
areas. Acree v. County Board of Education of Richmond Co., Ga., 294 F.Supp. 1034 (S.D.Ga. 1968).
Such a plan was submitted and approved on July
14, 1969. Acree v. County Board of Education of Richmond Co., Ga., 301 F.Supp. 1285 (S.D.Ga. 1969).
Shortly thereafter the school board was directed by
the Court to seek the assistance of the Department
of HEW in future planning.
2. PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
(1970)
By order of February 3, 1970 the District Court
required that the faculty be reconstituted on a racial
balance of 60%-40 % white to black. Accordingly,
some 500 teachers were reassig,ned to achieve this
distribution. Plaintiff subsequently appealed, and in
July of 1970 the Circuit Court remanded this case
for further findings. No decision was announced and
jurisdiction was retained. 2
Upon receipt of the Mandate, a Biracial Com2

This portion of the chronology appears to conflict slightly with
that set out in Appendix III. It is supported by entries in the
docket kept by the Clerk of Court.

4
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Data.
1.

School Capacities:
375 pupils
15 classrooms
Jenkins
800
Fleming
32
2. Pupils presently transported: 163.
Pupil Allocation Plan.
Fleming
Jenkins
W
B
Grade
w
B
Grade
41
51
4
64
49
1
30
26
5
51
62
2
40
50
6
35
71
3
57
25
7
168
152
197
135
320
332
47.5%
B
40.7% B
Transportation Estimate.
Jenkins to Fleming ----------------------------------- 155
Fleming to Jenkins ------------------------------------ 194
Jenkins (internal) ----------------------------------- ·-- 22
Fleming (internal) -------------------------------------- 41
Total transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 412
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION
PLAN III ZONE F

Per Cent
Black 30.2%

Totals
By Race
School
W

Schools

Craig ________________ _
Hains _____________________ _ 836
836
Total
A-47

B

346
16
362

346
852
1198

Bungalow Rd.
Grade

W

3
4

170
161

118
130

--

--

331

248

mittee was appointed by the District Judge, charged
with preparing recommendations for the possible
pairing of schools in the system. Additionally, the
desegregation plan developed by the Department of
HEW had been completed and was submitted to the
Court. It was approved by order dated August 3, 1970,
with implementation scheduled for the forthcoming
1970-1971 school year.

B

579
42.8% B
Transportation Eestirnates.
White
To W. Gardens ---------------------------------------To Bungalow Rd. -------------------------------------W. Gardens
To White -------------------------------------------------------To Bungalow Rd. __________________________ _

159
204
165
145

Bungalow Rd.
To White ----------------------------------------------------- 267
To W. Gardens -------------------------------------------- 164
Bung,alow Rd. (internal) _________________________ _ 107
W. Gardens (internal) ----------------------------- 68

Total transportation estimate (maximum) __________ 1279
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION
PLAN III ZONE E

Per Cent
Black 44.0%
Schools

Totals
By Race
W
B

Jenkins
7
Fleming _________________ _ 358
365
Totals
A-46

286
1
287

School

293
359
652

Also incorporated in this order were the suggestions of the Biracial Committee on pairing, as well
as majority to minority transfer provisions required
by Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970). Also included
was the proviso that space and free transportation
be made available for the transferring, student. Ellis
v. Board of Public Instruction, 423 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.
1970).
3. PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF
APPEALS (1970-1971)
Pursuant to instructions, the Record had been
returned to the Circuit Court in August of 1970 where
it was retained for 11 months. During this period
an .e ntire school year was completed under the Plan
devised by the Department of HEW. In April of 1971,
the decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). was announced.
Accordingly, this case was remanded by the Appeals
Court on July 1, 1971 with instructions to devise
a new plan in consonance with that opinion. Acree v.
County Board of Education of Richmond Co., Ga.,
443 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1971).
5

4.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
(1971-1972)

Defend ant school board was instructed to commence preparation at once. In a subsequent order of
July 28, 1971 the District Court further requested
that the Office of Education, Department of HEW,
make its full resources available in this regard.
A hearing on their proposals plan was scheduled
for August 26, 1971. What transpired is described
in the Court's Order:

136
Bayvale (internal)
Copeland (internal) ------------------------------------ 47
Total transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 1560
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION
PLAN III ZONE D

Per Cent
Black 43.7%

"To my amazement, the HEW officials did
not show up at the August 26, 1971 hearing.
Without notice or excuse, and at whose behest,
I do not know, they did a disappearing act." 3
Being understandably irate, the Court rejected
the school board recommendation with dispatch. It
was announced from the Bench that experts would be
employed for the preparation of desegration plans to
be filed by September 27, 1971. Two Rhode Island
professors were subsequently chosen. They drafted a
series of options for the District Judge which consisted of four Elementary Plans and two Secondary
Plans.
Intervention was sought at this crucial point. It
was granted on October 5, 1971 and Petitioners, freshly garbed with legal status, set out to resolve the
existing impasse. Unfortunately this goal was not
achieved, but efforts to do so were later recognized
in open court by the District Judge who remarked:
"I say you deserve a lot of credit for what
you have tried to do, to bring these warring fac3

Appendix III, Page A-13

6

Totals
By Race
School

Schools

W

White ____________________
W. Gardens ___________ _ 454
638
Bungalow Rd.
1092
Totals

B

710
131
7

848

710
585
645
1940

Data.

1. School Capacities:
31 classrooms 775 pupils
White
W. Gardens
24
600
Bungalow Rd. 29
725
2. Pupils presently transported:

544

Pupil Allocation Plan.
W. Gardens

White
Grade

w

5

162

6
7

138

112
119

148

106

B

Grade

W

1

157
156

2

313

B

134
129

263
576
45.7% B

448
337
785
42.9% B
A-45

Pupil Allocation Plan.
Bayvale

Collins
Grade

5

6
7

w

172
174
166

Grade

B

1
2
3*

136
141
162

512
439
951
46.2% B
Copeland
Grade

W

3#
4

w

B

177
172
50

131
129
25

399

285
684

41.7% B
B

134
171

105
144

305

249

554
44.9% B
*25 each from SW corner of Collins attendance
area.
SE corner of Copeland attendance area.
'remaining third graders
Transportation Estimate.
Collins
269
To Bayvale
To Copeland ------------------------------------------------ 236
Bayvale
To Collins ---------------------------------------------- 263
To Copeland ________________________________ _ 163
Copeland
To Collins _________________ --------------------------------- 265
To Bayvale _______________________
181

A-44

tions, in a terribly polarized city and community
together." 4
At the Intervenors request a hearing was held
December 16th and 17th for the purpose of presenting evidence concerning the various Plans in question. Upon conclusion the Bench announced that no
decision was forthcoming for 20 days. All counsel
were called into Chambers and strongly advised to
make a final effort at negotiation. Efforts to reach
an agreement ultimately proved futile and on January
13, 1972 the Order complained of was entered. l5 Acree
v. Drummond, 336 F.Supp. 1275 (S.D.Ga. 1972).
5 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT
OF APPEALS (1972)
Plaintiff immediately commenced an Appeal and
both remaining parties Cross-Appealed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in an
opinion rendered March 31, 1972 affirmed the ruling
of the Lower Court. 6 Acree v. County Board of Education of Richmond Co., Ga., 458 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.
1972). Petitioners sought Re-Hearing and were subsequently denied. 7
Pursuant to the Order on the Mandate, Defendant school board prepared and presented a Constitutionally-acceptable plan for the desegregation of the
secondary schools in the upcoming year. By order
dated June 13, 1972 this plan was approved by the
District Court. 8 No appeals were taken, and the time
for doing so has expired.
4

l5
6

7
8

Transcript of proceedings December 17, 1971, Page 266.
Appendix III hereto, details of Plan Appendix IV hereto.
Appendix I hereto.
Appendix II hereto.
It is in sharp contrast with the severity of the elementary plan
which Petitioners seek to have remoulded.

7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I
THIS IS THE MOST EXTREME DESEGREGATION ORDER EVER ENTERED! IT GOES FAR
BEYOND ANYTHING APPROVED BY THIS
COURT, AND IF DEEMED VALID THE CRITERIA
ESTABLISHED BY SWANN BECOMES ABSOLUTELY MEANINGLESS.
This claim, although extravagant, is well founded.
All that is required to reach this conclusion in the
present case is the application of principles established
by Swann, and a comparison of results.
While this Court recognized the transportation
of students as a permissible tool for desegregation,
its use was not made mandatory. Much to the contrary there is a clear caution that the techniques used
in Charlotte were made acceptable by the situation
which confronted the District Court.
"On the facts of this case, we are unable to
conclude that the order of the District Court is
not reasonable, feasible and workable." (p. 30)
(Emphasis added)
An overall reading of this decision leaves the indelible impression that the best which can be said of
the District Court's order is that it was not reversed.
It was never applauded and reflects only tepid acceptance. Restraint rather than adherence is implicit and
inclines one to view it as the outward limits of discretion.

While a Court's authority to fashion appropriate
remedies is correspondingly broad, it is not unrestricted.
8

Monte Sano

To Walker ------------------------------------------ 244
To Lamar ----------------------------------------------------- 73
To Lake Forest Dr. --------------------------------- 60
Lake Forest Dr.
139
To Walker
To Monte Sano ------------------------------------------- 95
Lamar (internal) ---------------------------------------- 51
Monte Sano (internal) ----------------------------- 91
Lake Forest Dr. (internal) _____________________ _ 45

Total transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 1462
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION

PLAN III ZONE C
Per Cent
Black 44.4%
Schools

Totals
By Race
School

W

Collins __________ _
0
Bayvale _________________ _ 618
598
Copeland
1216
Totals

B

928
42
3

973

928
660
601
2189

Data.

1. School Capacities:
Collins
41 classrooms
Bayvale 29
Copeland 23
2. Pupils presently transported:

A-43

1025 pupils
725

575
574.

2. Total presently transported: 546
Pupil Allocation Plan.
Walker
B

Grade

180
162
175

121
145
149

1*

517

415

Grade

W

5
6
7

20
3*

932
44.5% B

3#
4

W

122
174
296

156
15

216

195

B

24

411

47.4% B
Lake F. Dr.

Monte Sano
Grade

Lamar
w
40
127
49

B

Grade

91
157

l#
21

248

W

102
31

B

127
7

133

134
267
50.0% B

544

45.6% B
*Lamar pupils only
#Less Lamar
1Lake F. Dr. only
oan but Lake F. Dr.
Transportation Estimates.

Walker
To Lamar (2) --------------- - - ----------------- 125
To Monte Sano (3,4) ------------------- 216
To Lake Forest Dr. (1) --------------------------- 116
Lamar
To Walker ( 5,6,7) ________ _ _ ___________ 153
To Monte Sano ______________ _ _ _ _
54

A-42

"No fixed or even substantially fixed guidelines can be established as to how far a court can
go, but it must be recognized that there are limits."
(p. 28) (Emphasis added)
A recent lower court decision of considerable importance underscored this limitation, Bradley v. The
School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia,
_ _ F.2d _ _ (4th Cir. 1972), decided June 5,
1972.
Although the outward parameters of Swann may
be vague, certain prohibitions are most explicit. A
prime example of what a District Judge may not do
is illustrated by the claim that a particular degree of
racial balance was required in Charlotte schools.
The record discloses that the order resulted in
elementary schools whose composition ranged from
9 % to 38 % black as opposed to the system-wide average of 29 %.
Chief Justice Burger articulated quite forcefully
on this issue:
"If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require, as a matter of substantive
constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be
disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse."
(p. 24) (Emphasis added)
reiterated at Winston-Salem/Forstyth County Board
of Education v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221 (1972).
A comparison with the desegregation plan ordered
for the elementary schools of Richmond County shows
unquestionably that this imperative was either miscostrued or misapplied.
This plan required that 29 of the existing 42
9

elementary schools be paired or grouped into 10 separate zones with racial distribution as shown below: 9
Zones
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

H
I
ALT.
TOTALS

Schools Pupils % Black
4
1522
40.8
4
2154
46.1
2189
44.4
3
3
1940
43.7
2
652
44.0
2
1198
30.2
3
960
38.8
3
1080
43.1
2
1113
40.1
1684
3
34.2
14,492
29
41.02 Overall Black

From the diagram one is forced to conclude that
awareness of the 60%-40% racial composition of the
whole system was not utilized simply as a useful starting point in shaping, a remedy. In the final analysis
Court-ordered clustering results in an overall black
percentage that deviates only 1.02% from the system
average.
Even the individual zones evidence a persistent
abherence to this ratio. This point is illustrated by
the permissible range of variation from the overall
average. In Charlotte a fluctuaiton of 29% was accepted, whereas the latitude here is only 15 % or 1/ 2
that amount. Stated conversely, the restriction imposed on Augusta was twice as extreme.
Based on all these factors, it cannot be said that
"the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was
within the discretion of the Court." On the contrary,
D

Appendix V hereto.
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Milledge
To Evans -------------------------------------------------------- 210
To Telfair
205
Evans
To Milledge ---------------------------------------------- 15
To Telfair --------------------------------------------------- 10
Houghton
To Telfair --------------------------------------------------- 77
To Evans -------------------------------------------- 120
To Milledge ------------------------------------------------- 185
Evans (internal) ---------------------------------------- 15
Total Transportation estimate (maximum) ________ 952
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION
PLAN III ZONE B
Per Cent
Black 46.1
Totals

Schools

By Race
W
B

Walker _________________ _
0
Lamar __________________ _ 345
Monte Cano _________ _ 528
Lake F. Dr. ___________ _ 289
1162
Totals

799
131
27
35
992

School

799
476
555
324

2154

Data.
1. School Capacities:

Walker
43 classrooms 1075 pupils
Lamar
23
575
575
Monte Sano
23
325
Lake Forest Dr.13
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Evans _____________________ 90
Milledg.e ________________ 667
Houghton ______________ 140
901
Totals

2
105
272
621

Data.
1. School Capacities:
19 classrooms
Telfair
23
Evans
Milledge
31
Houghton
22

2. Total presently transported:

6
7

w
124
121

99
87

245

186

550

B

Grade

W

1
2
3

153
154
102

91
91
67

409

249

658
37.8% B

431
43.1% B
4
5

475 pupils
575
775

Milledge
B

Grade

These results are achieved by a massive increase
in transportation. This is a volatile · subj.ect which
Swann dealt with in a most guarded manner:

120.

Pupil Allocation Plan.
Telfair
Grade

it is the product of a desegregation plan which relied
entirely upon them. Such a standard is Constitutionally impermissible.

92
772
412
1522

Evans
w
121
126

B

100
86
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In Richmond County there are 21,795 elementary
students, of which 6,945, or 31.86 % , were already being bused. 10 The order of the District Court required
a transportation increase of 6,172 elementary students.11
This escalation has very startling, consequences,
for it creates a situation in which 61.77% of the elementary school children must now .be bused.
Even more drastic is the impact upon the students in the 29 schools paired or clustered. Under the
HEW plan 21.57 % of the students .enrolled in these

247
186
433
43.0% B
Transportation Estimate
Telfair
To Evans -------------------- --------------------------------To Milledge _________________________ _

"The scope of permissible transportation of
students as an implement of a remedial decree has
never been defined by this Court and by the very
nature of the problem it cannot be defined with
precision." (p. 29)
Under the "Finger Plan" 9,300 additional elementary students were required to be transported from
a total Charlotte elementary population of 44,000. No
figures were reported on the number bused prior, but
the total for the entire system amounted to 21 %.

10

19
86

All computations concerning Augusta-Richmond County Schools

are based on figures contained in the Munzer Plans, a portion
.
of which is set out in Appendix V hereto.
116,172 reflects the correct increase in elementary busing. It is
in conflict with the figure of 5,681 as shown by the District
Court's Order, Appendix III hereto, which fails to include Alternate Zone.

11

schools were bused, a figure which now soars to
64.16%.
In considering the elementary portion of the Charlotte plan the Circuit Court determined that its increases were too extreme. They illustrated this conclusion by a formula which provides a useful comparison here. 12
Percentage Increase of Additional Elementary
Students Bussed As Opposed To All Students
Presently Bussed
Charlotte
39 % or 33 % as Computed
by Minority
Richmond County 58 %

By this standard the disparity is perhaps more
apparent. The increased elementary busing in this
case is at least 19% greater than the figure classified
by one Court as too extreme.
Even though this portion of Swann was ultimately
reversed there is no indication that such increases
would be approved elsewhere. Certainly there is nothing to indicate that they could be expanded to an
even greater extent.
Perhaps the most formidable consequence of the
District Court's Order is the effect it has on the grade
structure of elementary schools. Previously the school
system had been operated on a 7-2-3 basis which enabled a child to complete the first seven years in one
school.

attending increases in times and distances. However, it is a reasonable and feasible plan which
could be easily organized and administered.
Plan III.
Plan III results in a relatively small increase in
transportation over Plan II. Its main feature is
the effect on Floyd School which is an inner Black
school. The total number of schools affected is 26.
This plan is considered reasonable and feasible. It
results in rather extensive chang,es in the total
school system and therefore poses a more complicated administrative problem.
Plan IV.
Plan IV results in virtually complete desegregation. One all-White and one all-Black school remain. However, 29 out of 38 elementary schools
fall within the 30 to 50% range of per cent Black.
The transportation is extensive and distances are
approaching undesirable levels. Zone J, for example, probably requires more than 45 minutes
transportation time each way for children traveling between Hornsby and either Hains or Fleming. This plan can be justified as reasonable and
feasible if transportation time of about one hour
each way is acceptable.
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
COMBINED ZONE INFORMATION
PLAN III ZONE A

Per Cent Black 40.8

Pursuant to this order 69 % of the elementary
schools have been paired or clustered. They no longer

Schools

Totals
By Race
School
W
B

12431 F .2d 138, 147 (4th Cir. 1970).

Telfair

4

12
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242

246

4. The proposed allocation of pupils to schools
and the effects on composition of enrollment.
5. An estimate of transportation demanded to
implement the proposed zone.
6. Comments when needed.
7. Two copies of this report contain maps for
each plan. The maps indicate the various zoning combinations which comprise the particular zones.
The four plans for the elementary schools are organized to present four alternative levels of deseg;regation. The fundamental basis for each plan is explained below. It should be noted that in all four plans
the Houghton School is closed because of its age and
poor condition.
Plan I.
Plan I is a minimal plan which .emphasizes desegregation of schools on the borders of the Black
concentration in Augusta. In the main, Black
schools are combined with contiguous and adjacent White schools. In only one case, a Black
school is zoned with two nearby schools. This plan
affects the enrollments of 16 schools and develops
a minimum of transportation problems related to
time and distance. This plan is not only reasonable
and feasible but it can be easily organized and
administered.
Plan II.
Plan II extends the amount of desegregation to
moderate levels. The number of schools affected is
increased to 21. Transportation is increased with
A-38

have a standard grade structure, as the number of
grades in a particular school depends on the number
of schools in its zone. The size of the zone also dictates
the number of schools a child must now attend during
the course of elementary education.
Seven zones are composed of either three or four
schools. The students who attend these schools constitute 53 % of the entire elementary population. Thus
we have a situation which requires over 1/2 of the
elementary children in the system to attend three or
four separate schools in seven years.
The absurdity of this arrangement is emphasized
by comparison with the "F'inger Plan." 13 It served to
pair or cluster 46 % of Charlotte elementary schools
in such a manner as to achieve a 1-4 and 5-6 grade
structure.
By these categories compulsory changes are minimized. Elementary children will therefore attend, at
the most, only two schools. This is a factor readily
distinguished from the procrustean demands of the
Augusta counterpart.
A portion of Swann is addressed directly to this
combination of evils:
"An objection to transportation of students
may have validity when the time or distance of
travel is so great as to risk either the health of
the children or significantly impinge on the educational process." (p. 30)
Transportation of better than six of every ten
elementary students, some over long distance, in conjunction with the requirement that 53 % must attend
1

a311 F.Supp. 265, 280, 281 (W.D. N. Car. 1970).

13

three or four elementary schools is indeed a situation
which, "impinges on the educational process."

APPENDIX V

A school desegregation plan must also have room
for pragmatic considerations. A restriction is implicit
in Swann:
"25. The remedial technique of requiring
bus transportation of public school students for
purposes of racial desegregation is within a Federal District Court's power to provide equitable
relief, where ...
****
(2) implementation of the District Court's
decree is well within the capacity of the local
school authority." (Emphasis added)
This was resolved affirmatively in Charlotte for
obvious reasons. The school system had a total operating budg,et of $51,000,000 of which approximately
$500,000, or less than 1 % (.0098), was spent for annual
transportation costs.14
The cost of increased elementary transportation
was determined to be $672,000, or only 1.2% of the
annual budget. Combined with current transportation
expenditures it amounted to no more than 2.3 % of
that budget.
A radically different situation exists for Augusta's
school system whose annual budget is only $21,000,000.
Of this sum $572,000 was spent for transportation before the Court order. This is 2.7% of the total budget
and represents a larger portion than was spent in
Charlotte even after the increased elementary costs.
Here the additional transportation will require
$644,000, 1 ~ or 3. 7 % , of the budget. When combined

SUGGESTED PLANS

431 F.2d 138, 156 (4th Cir. 1970).
~This is a minimum figure and requires that schools be opened
at staggered hours ranging from 7:30-10:30 A.M.

14

1

14

related to
DESEGREGATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

of
AUGUSTA AND RICHMOND COUNTY, GEORGIA

Prepared for Judge Alexander Lawrence
by
J. Howard Munzer
and
Myrl G. Herman
THE PUPIL DESEGREGATION PLANS

This report contains four plans for desegregating
the elementary schools of Richmond County and two
plans for desegregating the secondary schools. For
purposes of clear presentation the design for these
plans follows a uniform pattern. Each plan is noted
by Roman numeral. Composite zones constituting each
plan are labeled by capital letters. For example, Plan
I contains five combinations of attendance zones. The
combined zones are denoted as A, B, C, D and E. Each
zone is organized separately. The information pertaining to each zone is as follows:
1.

The zone designation.

2.

Present enrollment data of schools in the zone.

3.

Additional data on school capacities and transportation.
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that State or local authorities are practicing racial
discrimination in assigning students to public schools
shall be uniform throughout the United States.
Application of Proviso of Section 407(a) of The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 To The Entire United States
Sec. 806. The proviso of section 407 (a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 providing in substance that
no court or official of the United States shall be empowered to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial
balance in any school by requiring the transportation
of pupils or students from one school to another or
one school district to another in order to achieve such
racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power
of the court to insure compliance with constitutional
standards shall apply to all public school pupils and
to every public school system, public school and public
school board, as defined by title IV, under all circumstances and conditions and at all times in every State,
district, territory, Commonwealth, or possession of
the United States, regardless of whether the residence
of such public school pupils or the principal offices
of such public school system, public school or public
school board is situated in the northern, eastern,
western, or southern part of the United States.

with current outlays it amounts to some 5.8%. The
aggregate of these costs, irrespective of percentages,
is $44,000 more than the comparable figure in Charlotte.
In the space of a single year this school system
has been wrenched to an unbelievable extreme. Only
12 months ago schools were operated under an HEW
plan approved by the District Court.
Without respite or interlude it is now decreed
that an incredible gulf be leaped in a single bound.
How has this all come about? The only plausible
answer is that the lower court misread the requirements of Swann.
Very persuasive support for this proposition is
found in the words of the District Judge wherein he
categorizes it as the "Busing" and "Racial Ratio
Case". 16
Several other Courts have viewed it differently,
and, I think, properly.
"While this case approved the use of busing
as one tool for school desegregation, it did not
hold that the plan implemented in Charlotte was
a Constitutionally commanded Plan, or that a less
drastic Plan might not have met Constitutional
requirements." Davis v. Board of Education of
North Little Rock, Ark., 328 F.Supp. 1197, 1204
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
Even more emphatically:
"We therefore, initially observe that while
the Supreme Court found legally tolerable what
may be referred to as the Mecklenburg rule, it by
no means directed that its commands be obeyed
everywhere. (p. 636)
16Appendix III hereto.
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And later:
"Swann approved a District Court ordered
plan for the busing of children to improve the
racial mix in the involved school system. It did not,
however, direct that a plan of transporting school
children must be a part of every new plan for
improvement of the objective of desegregation."
GOSS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF
KNOXVILLE, TENN., 444 F.2d 632, 637 (6th Cir.
1971). (Emphasis added)
Recent Courts in some instances have even found
busing to be undesirable. A graphic example may be
seen in Calhoun v. Cook, ___ F.Supp. - - - , (N.D.
Ga. 1972) decided June 8, 1972. Here the District
Judges for the second time expressly rejected a mass
busing plan for Atlanta, Georgia.
This determination was reached after an incisive
appraisal of busing, its ramifications, and the competing interests involved.
Such a conclusion is justified by the words of Chief
Justice Burger:
"A school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the
framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial
of a constitutional right. The task is to correct,
by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution." (Emphasis added.) (pp. 15, 16)
This clearly contemplates that busing is a remedy
that must be chosen and limited with regard to other
values upon which it impinges.
The availability of less rending solutions is well
illustrated by the secondary schools. A constitutional
plan for their desegregation was approved by the
16

criminatory system of school assignments based on
geographic zones established without discrimination
on account of race, religion, color, or national origin.
(c) An applicable program means a program to
which the General Education Provisions Act applies.
Provision Relating To Court Appeals

Sec. 803. Notwithstanding any other law or provision of law, in the case of any order on the part of
any United States district court which requires the
transfer or transportation of any student or students
from any school attendance area prescribed by competent State or local authority for the purposes of
achieving a balance among students with respect to
r ace, sex, religion, or socioeconomic status, the effectiveness of such order shall be postponed until all appeals in connection with such order have been exhausted or, in the event no appeals are taken, until
the time for such appeals has expired. This section
shall expire at midnight on January 1, 1974.
Provision Authorizing Intervention in Court Orders

Sec. 804. A parent or guardian of a child, or parents or guardians of children similarly situated, transported to a public school in accordance with a court
order, may seek to reopen or intervene in the further
implementation of such court order, currently in effect, if the time or distance of travel is so great as to
risk the health of the student or significantly impinge
on his or her educational process.
Provision Requiring That Rules of Evidence
Be Uniform

Sec. 805. The rules of evidence required to prove
A-35

ported will be substantially inferior to those opportunities offered at the school to which such student
would otherwise be assigned under a nondiscriminatory system of school assignments based on geographic
zones established without discrimination on account of
race, religion, color, or national origin.
(b) No officer, ag,ent, or employee of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (including
the Office of Education), the Department of Justice,
or any other Federal agency shall, by rule, regulation,
order, guideline, or otherwise, (1) urge, persuade, induce, or require any local education agency, or any
private nonprofit agency, institution, or organization
to use any funds derived from any State or local
sources for any purpose, unless constitutionally required, for which Federal funds appropriated to carry
out any applicable program may not be used, as provided in this section, or (2) condition the receipt of
Federal funds under any Federal program upon any
action by any State or local public officer or employee
which would be prohibited by clause (1) on the part
of a Federal officer or employee. No officer, agent, or
employee of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (including the Office of Education) or
any other Federal agency shall urge, persuade, induce,
or require any local education agency to undertake
transportation of any student where the time or disstance of travel is so great to risk the health of the
child or significantly impinge on his or her educational process; or where the educational opportunities
available at the school to which it is proposed that
such student be transported will be substantially inferior to those offered at the school to which such
student would otherwise be assigned under a nondisA-34

same Court on June 13, 1972. It did not require the
extremes of the elementary plan, more importantly,
it was accomplished without significant increase in
busing.
We therefore have a complete inversion with the
burdens cast upon the young. Certainly this is a
travesty Swann intended to avoid by recognizing
that the limits on permissible transportation would
be affected by many factors:
". . . but probably with none more than the
age of the students." (p. 31) (Emphasis added)

II
LEGISLATION ENACTED JUNE 23, 1972 IS
IN APPARENT CONFLICT WITH CONCLUSIONS
REACHED BY THIS COURT IN SWANN. ITS
LANGUAGE HAS NOT BEEN INTERPRETED BY
ANY COURT AND GIVES RISE TO ISSUES
WHICH MAY AFFECT EVERY AREA OF THE
COUNTRY.
The foregoing reflects quite aptly the vicissitudes
of Constitutional interpretation in this area of law.
Recent legislation promises further obfuscation and
constitutes a valid quandary.
With passage of the EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972 Congress has rejuvenated issues
once thought resolved. The relevant provisions are
set out in Title VIII, § 803-806, captioned "Prohibition
Against Assignment or Transportation of Students
to Overcome Racial Imbalance." 17
Of immediate significance is § 806 which directs
I7Appendix IV hereto.
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that a proviso, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, shall
apply to the entire United States. The substance of
this proviso is that no Court shall be empowered to
order the transportation of students to achieve racial
balance. It is a restatement of the identical language
interpreted by Swann with the added requirement
of uniform application.
Obviously, however, Congress did not subscribe
to the meaning accorded their words by this decision.
Had this not been the case there would have been no
need for subsequent repetition.
All of this brings us to a perplexing impasse.
§ 806, on its face, seems to preclude an order such as
the one contained in this case. A result entirely to
the contrary was reached by Swann based primarily
upon the disparate status of de jure and de facto
states.

,.. ..... .., --I
APENDIX IV • •I-• ••""1 -1....,,,.,1 ,.J:r,
EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972,

EN ACTED JUNE 23, 1972
TITLE VIII-GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING
TO THE ASSIGNMENT OR TRANSPORTATION
OF STUDENTS
Prohibition Against Assignment or Transportation of
Students to Overcome Racial Imbalance

Sec. 801. N..,Q_ £.:Ovision of J1!,~~ Act shall be construed to require the assignment or transportation of
1
students,, or teachers in order to overcome (racial imbalance.
Prohibition Against Use of Appropriated Funds
For Busing

"The rules of evidence required to prove that
State or local authorities are practicing racial
discrimination in assigning students to public
schools shall be uniform throughout the United
States."
Discrimination by state authorities is a basic ingredient of the facto - de jure, dichotomy. The standards of proof in this regard have been quite different.

Sec. 802(a). No funds appropriated for the purpose of carrying out any ·applicable program I}lay be
u~ed f ~ h~
rtation _, of students or teachers
( or for the pure aseol eqmpment for such transportation) in order to overcome racial imbalance in any
school or school system, or for the transportation of
students or teachers ( or for the purchase of equipment for such transportation) in order to carry out
a plan of racial desegregation of any school or school
system, except on the express written voluntary request of appropriate local school officials. No such
funds shall be made available for transportation when
the time or distance of travel is so great as to risk
the health of the children or significantly imping.e on
the educational process of such children, or where the
educational opportunities available at the school to
which it is proposed that any such student be trans-

18
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Both versions cannot be reconciled. The interpretation arrived at by this Court depends upon a distinction, while uniformity requirements of subsequent
identical legislation demand that there be none.
A further example of the legislative intention to
abrogate this historical distinction is provided by
§ 805 which states:

basis, with the provisions for "Desegregation of Faculty and Other Staff" as set forth in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, et al., 419 F.2d
1211 (5 Cir.). The School Board is directed to file
semi-annual reports during each school year similar
to those required in United States v. Hinds County
School Board (5 Cir.), 433 F.2d 611, 618.
(8) The pending motions filed by the plaintiffs
for appointment of a receiver for the Richmond
County system and for adjudging the defendants in
contempt will be held in abeyance, at least for the
present.
(9) The evidence at the hearing on December 16,
1971, indicates that there are numerous instances
where pupils are attending schools in zones outside
their actual residence. The Board, Superintendent
and school officials are ordered promptly to undertake
corrective measures in respect to boundary observance. A report in that respect shall be furnished not
later than February 1, 1972.
(10) The motion for award of attorney's fees to
plaintiffs' counsel is granted. The amount of the fee
will be settled on affidavits or, if necessary, following
a hearing on the subject.
(11) The defendant Board will, as a part of the
costs in the case, pay the compensation and expenses
of Messrs. Munzer and Herman for their services to
this Court and same are assessed as costs ag,ainst defendants.
This 13th day of January, 1972.
ALEXANDER A. LAWRENCE
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Southern District of Georgia
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Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 445
F.2d 990, 1006, (10 Cir. 1971).

Both of these sections are worded to insure absolute parity. Such a result is incompatible with the
perpetuation of this hoary distinction. There must
now be one uniform classification of states.
Consequently two alternative interpretations are
possible. Either Congress has created a right of action in de facto states or the prohibition of Court
ordered transportation applies in de jure situations.
The latter conclusion seems infinitely more plausible. It is substantiated by the fact that both provisions are contained in legislation which is clearly
recognized as "anti-busing" in nature. This consideration is especially important with regard to § 806 whose
language was first contained in the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, a measure concerned only with the promulgation
of desegregation.
The prohibition of Court ordered transportation
for racial balance is a legitimate exercise of the "enforcement powers" granted Congress by § 5 of the
14th Amendment. This is a positive grant of legislative power entrusting to Congress the same broad
powers afforded them by the "Necessary and Proper"
clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
By restating the law in this manner Congress has
imposed a simple and prudent restriction on how the
goals of this Amendment are best accomplished. Desegregation is not prescribed, only a method. There
are still half a dozen or more remedies, currently used
19

in school cases, which remain available to a District
Court.
Article III empowers Congress to create inferior
Federal Courts. The Constitution grants no original
jurisdiction to such courts, it comes from Congress.
It is axiomatic, therefore, that the body empowered
to grant jurisdiction may take it away.
"The congressional power to 'ordain and establish' inferior courts includes the power of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character
which to Congress may seem proper for the public
good." Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, (1943).
Congress has therefore limited the jurisdiction
of District Courts to issue busing orders. Jurisdiction
is the power to declare the law and without it all that
remain is to dismiss the cause. Ex parte McCARDLE,
74 U.S. 264 (1869).

(3) Minor adjustments in the Plan may be made
by defend ants as to alternate assignments in the instance of special education classes provided that the
desegregation levels outlined in the plans are maintained.
(4) The Superintendent of Schools shall file a
report in writing with this Court on January 19, 1972,
detailing what has been done by him and by the defendant Board since this Order was signed in preparing, planning and carrying out the implementation of
Phase One and Phase Two of Plan III. Similar written
reports shall be filed by him at the end of each successive three-day period after such date until further
order of this Court.
( 5) Meanwhile, the Court will continue to consider and to endeavor to formulate and develop a
feasible and sound plan of desegregation for the secondary schools in the system. At the earliest practicable
time an Order in that respect will be entered. The
::econdary school plan approved and ordered by the
Court will be implemented by defendants on September 1, 1972.
(6) The defendant Board and the Superintendent will file in this Court within 15 days a report
showing the total enrollment during the present school
year in every school in the system and the number of
blacks and whites in each such school. The report will
also include information as to racial composition of
faculty and staff in the schools.
(7) It is further ordered that the Board shall immediately review existing staff and faculty racial
ratios and shall forthwith comply, on a system-wide
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that, there is at present no plan before the Court upon
which it can act. Dr. Munzer and Mr. Herman presented two alternative plans for desegregation of
secondary schools but at the hearing on December 16th
last the possibility was raised that there might be discrimination against the plaintiffs in that Josey and
Laney High Schools, which are all-black or practically
so, would no longer be graduating schools whereas
none of the predominantly white senior high schools
have been thus treated in the plans. I have asked that
the experts suggest alternative plans as to the secondary schools in the Richmond County system dealing
with that problem.

ORDER
(1) It is ordered and decreed that the desegregation of the elementary schools in the Richmond
County system shall be in accordance with this Order.
Defendants are directed promptly to take all necessary steps to the end that Plan III shall be implemented in the three phases described in this Order.
No stay will be granted pending any appeal by any
party from this Order.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the
petition for certiorari should be granted to review the
order entered January 13, 1972, and the judgment
entered March 31, 1972, by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Respectfully submitted
0. TORBITT IVEY, JR.
Suite 500
The 500 Building
Augusta, Georgia 30902
Attorney for Petitioners
July 28, 1972
HARRIS, CHANCE & McCRACKEN

(2) Responsibility as to implementation will be
and is imposed upon the Board and the Superintendent
of Schools and they are ordered to fully and timely
implement Plan III for the elementary schools. If the
Board does not act promptly in any case in which any
discretionary authority is conferred upon it by this
Order, the discretion in that respect will be exercised
by the Superintendent and he is directed in any such
instance to act and full responsibility is imposed upon
him.
A-30
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have on this day served
the Honorables Franklin H. Pierce, Leonard 0. Fletcher, Jr., and J. H. Ruffin, counsel for respondents, by
personally handing them three copies each of the
within Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
This 28 day of July, 1972.

0. TORBITT IVEY, JR.
Suite 50
The 500 Building
Augusta, Georgia 30902
Attorney for Petitioners

ing schools designed to draw either from the white or
black school population, not from both. New schools
have been erected with resulting preservation of a
segregated system. By and large, the Negro schools
lie in the heart of a densely populated black area of
Augusta. White schools follow residential patterns.
Lack of new and more strategically located middle
grade schools compound the problem.
Irrespective of obstacles, the Fourteenth Amendment, as construed by federal courts, demands that
the dual system now in existence be "wiped out root
and branch" and "not tomorrow but now." However,
you cannot in one day chop down and dig up the
stump of a tree which rooted two centuries ago. Deseg,regation will be delayed on the secondary level until
September 1, 1972. 5 It must be fully accomplished by
that date and will be. As I stated on another occasion, it is phantasy approaching autism to think that
the Constitution of the United States treats Augusta
differently from other places where a dual system is
the result of de jure school segregation. Richmond
County is no different from 42 other school districts
in the Southern District of Georgia in which desegregation is now an accomplished fact; admittedly with
travail in certain cases.
Earlier in this Order, I referred to some of the
difficulties of mid-year desegregation, particularly
high schools. At this time and during the current
school year it would be chaotic, if not impossible, to
implement any major plan in respect to desegregation
of secondary schools in Richmond County. More than
Of course, in event of appeal and reversal of this Order the
Board must be prepared to desegregate all schools during this
year.
5
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race Manor and Wheeless Road schools. The percentage of black pupils in Glenn Hills and Terrace Manor
are high, averaging 48.1 per cent in the two schools.
If these schools should be combined with Wheeless
Road School which is predominantly white, the average percentage of black upils would be 34.2. There is
presently a total enrollment of 1,684 pupils in the three
schools and a capacity of 1,650 according to school
data. Consequently, there is a need for two additional
classrooms which, logically, would accommodate a class
at Glenn Hill school and a class at Wheeless Road
school.
The result of combining Glenn Hills, Terrace
Manor and Wheeless Road schools according to an
analysis of pupil population and available space is
shown below:
Rms.

Terrace
Manor
Glenn
Hills
Wheeless
Road

Sp. Ed. Needed
'71 Plan and
Class
Room Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms
'71
Avail.
Needs Tchr.

Pupils
per
Plan

Grade

508

1-2

20

0-1

20

21

+1

340

3-4

13

0-0

14

13

-1

836

4-7

33

0-1

33

32

-1

Rooms
+or-

SECONDARY SCHOOLS

The desegregation of the secondary school system
in Richmond County presents the same difficulties
that is experienced in any large urban school district.
The problems stem not only from vestiges of Stateimposed segregation but from the practice since 1954
of school boards perpetuating dual systems by buildA-28

APPEN DIX

ACREE v. CTY. BD. OF EDUC. OF RICHMOND

BY THE COURT: These are appeals from the
order of the district court dated January 13, 1972,
directing implementation of a desegregation plan for
the schools of Richmond County, Georgia. The history
of this case is well documented by the district court.
Acree, et al v. Drummond, et al v. County Board of
Education of Richmond County, Georgia. et. al, __
F. Supp. _
(S.D., Ga., January 13, 1972).
The County Board of Education and Intervenors
raise numerous objections to the desegregation plan
being implemented by the district court, most of which
do not even merit discussion. The major contention
is that the district court erred in requiring "forced
bussing" to achieve racial balance, in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court made quite clear
that bussing is an available tool for use by district
courts in achieving school desegregation. In the instant
case the district court utilized this tool along with
the pairing, clustering and zoning methods long authorized by the Supreme Court and this court. Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra;
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971); Boykins v. Fairfield Board
of Education,_ F.2d _
(5th Cir., 1972) [No. 713028, Feb. 23, 1972] ; Singleton v. Jackson Municipal
Separate School District, 432 F.2d 927 (5th Cir., 1970).
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education pupils at Robinson. Acceptable solutions include the following:
(1)

Move 6 classes for special education to Weed
Elementary School or

(2)

Move Grade 6 to Weed Elementary School.

The Board of Education may adopt one or the
other of these solutions.
Zone H

Zone H clusters Floyd, Garrett and National Hills
elementary schools. Pupil population and available
space analysis indicates the following as to Zone H:

Floyd
Garrett
National
Hills

Rms.
Sp. Ed. Needed
'71 Plan and
Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms
Tchr.
Avail.
'71

per
Plan
Pupils

Grade

Class
Room
Needs

309
466

6-7
3-5

12
19

0-0
20-3

12
22

23
20

+11

305

1-2

12

0-0

12

14

+2

Rooms
+or-

-2

There is an indicated shortage of two classrooms
at Garrett. Solutions for this problem include:
(1) The shifting of two special education classes
to Floyd Elementary School or to National Hills.
(2) The shifting of Grade 5 from Garrett to
Floyd Elementary School.
The Board of Education may adopt one or the
other of these possible solutions.
ALTERNATIVE PLAN

(See pages 45 and 46 of original Munzer-Herman Plan)
The Alternative Plan includes Glenn Hills, Ter-

u.s.c. § 2000c.
A-2
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Zone B

Walker
Lamar
Monte Sano
Lake F.Dr.

Pupils
per
Plan

Grade

Class
Room
Needs

932
411
544
267

5-7
1-3
3-4
1-2

38
16
22
11

ACREE v. CTY. BD. OF EDUC. OF RICHMOND
Rms.
Sp. Ed. Needed
'71 Plan and
Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms
Tchr.
'71
Avail.

Rooms
+or-

43-3
10-1
0-0
0-0

41
17
22
11

43
23
23
13

+2
+6
+1
+2

19-2
0-0
0-0

40
27
22

41
29
23

+1
+2
+1

Zone C
Collins
Bayvale
Copeland

951
684
554

5-7
1-3
3-4

38
27
22
Zone F

Pupils
per
Plan

Craig
Hains

506
692

Class
Room
Needs

Grade

1-3
4-7

Rms.
Sp. Ed. Needed
'71 Plan and
Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms
'71
Tchr.
Avail.

20
28

0-0
0-0

20
28

20
30

Rooms

+ or..0
+2

Zone G
Zone G, Plan III, clusters Weed, Robinson and
Merry elementary schools. An analysis of pupil population and available space in Zone G shows:

Weed
Robinson
Merry

Pupils
per
Plan

Grade

Class
Room
Needs

143
294
523

5
6-7
1-4

6
18
21

funs.
Sp. Ed. Needed
'71 Plan and
Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms
'71
Tchr.
Avail.

0-0
40-4
0-0

6
22
21

12
16
22

Rooms
+or-

+6
-6
+1

No space or special education problems are invalved in Zone G. A problem does exist which grows
out of the need of six additional classrooms for special
A-26

The argument that the equity powers of federal
district courts have been limited by Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been rejected in Swann,
where the Court found no intent on the part of Congress to restrict the powers of federal cour ts to enforce the equal protection clause or "to withdraw from
courts their historic equitable remedial powers." 402
U.S. at 17.
The board and intervenors contend, however, that
the district court's order ir reparably harms "quality
education" in Richmond County. The district court
should not, and did not, permit the use of such platitudes to perpetuate a dual school system, nor could
it permit defendants to reply on the inferiority of
certain school facilities to which children wer e to be
tr ansferred as a justification fo r continued racial discrimination. The Court in Swann stated unequivocally:
"In default by the school authorities of their obligation to pr off er acceptable remedies, a district
court has broad power t o f ashion a r emedy that
will assure a unitary school system. 402 U.S. at
16."
The Richmond County Boar d of Education has operat ed and continues to oper ate a de jure as well as
a de facto segregated system, and has long been under
order to desegregate. See Acree v. County Board of
Education of Richmond County, Ga., 399 F.2d 151
(5th Cir., 1968). Despite a clear duty, the Board has
offer ed no viable constitutional alternative t o the plan
implemented by the court below, but instead has enACREE v. CTY. BD. OF EDUC. OF RICHMOND
gaged in conduct only designed to disrupt and delay
A-3

the disestablishment of a dual system.
From our review of the plan adopted by the district court and the evidence presented, we are of the
firm view that there is no indication whatsoever that
the transportation required as a result of the court's,
plan would adversely affect the health of the children
or impinge on the educational process. We are also
convinced that a good faith effort by the school board
will overcome any logistical problems that might arise.
The issues raised by plaintiffs have been dealt
with by our prior order of February 8, 1972, in which
we required the district court to consider plaintiffs'
alternate plan along with those submitted by the
court's experts in the development of a unitary system
for the secondary schools of Richmond County.
We too recognize the practical problems which
forced the district court to delay implementation of
a plan for the secondary schools, and there are now
little more than two months remaining in the school
year. However, in view of the serious delays which
have occurred in this case over past years, we order
that a plan be developed immediately for the secondary schools, that some demonstrable progress be
made now 2 and that a schedule be adopted forthwith
in order that a constitutional plan will be implemented
at the beginning of the 1972-73 school year.
ACREE v. CTY. BD. OF EDUC. OF RICHMOND

The district court is required to take whatever
steps are necessary under its equity powers to assure
2

For example, transportation facilities needed as a result of the
plan should be arranged, funds applied for, budget changes
contemplated, etc.
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As indicated by the above table, there is a shortage of eleven rooms at Southside. The school district
data furnished by the Superintendent's office shows
that Southside has fifteen rooms. This would give it
a capacity of 375 pupils on the basis of 25 pupils per
classroom. However, it is noted that at the prese11,t
time the school has an enrollment of 675. It follows
that there must be more than fifteen classrooms at
Southside elementary. Plan III, Zone I, indicates a
school population of 650 at Southside which is smaller
than the present enrollment figure.
PHASE THREE, ELEMENTARY

The third and final phase of desegregation of the
elementary schools in Richmond County involves Zones
B, C, F, G, H, and the Alternative Zone outlined on
page 45 of the original plan of desegregation. Phase
Three will be fully implemented on September 1, 1972.
I have deferred the desegregation of the schools in
these zones until the beginning of the next school year
and in doing so have taken into consideration the fact
that the transposition from a dual system to a unitary
system will involve adjustments of a major character
and that it is impractical and unwise to convert the
system overnight at mid-year.
Zones B, C and F in Plan Three present no space
or special education problems. An analysis of pupil
population and space availability in regard to the four
Zones in question shows as follows:
A-25

PHASE TWO, ELEMENTARY
Zone E

Phase Two of the implementation of Plan III is
approved and adopted and will be implemented not
later than March 15, 1972. This Phase relates to Zone
E and Zone I.
Zone E is made up of Jenkins and Fleming elementary which will be paired. No problem exists in
respect to special education pupils.
An analysis of pupil population and available pupil
space in the pairing of Jenkins and Fleming appears
below:

compliance and cooperation from the school board in
implementing a plan for the secondary schools and in
carrying out the three phases of its desegregation plan
for the elementary schools of Richmond County. 3
The order of the district court of January 13, 1972
is AFFIRMED as modified herein.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
The effect of the district court's plan, of course, is not to be
ameliorated by such practices as segregation by race in the
classroom. If the court receives evidence of such behavior, it
should take further steps to enforce its decree. See Moses v.
Washington Parish School Board, _ _ F.2d _ _ (5th Cir.,
1972) [No. 71-2561, March 8, 1972].
Adm. Office, U.S. Courts-Scofields' Quality Printers, Inc., N. 0.,

3

La.

Rms.
Pupils
per

Jenkins
Fleming

Plan

Grade

Class
Room
Needs

332
320

1-3
4-7

13
13

Sp. Ed. Needed
for ..'71 Plan .. and
Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms

Tchr.

'71

Avail.

15-2
22-2

15
15

15
32

Rooms

+or0
+17

Zone I

Zone I involves the pairing of Griggs and Southside elementary schools. The transportation problem
presents greater distances than Zones A, D or E.
Griggs and Southside are located approximately 4.2
miles straight line distance from each other. The
analysis of pupil population and available space indicates the following with respect to this Zone:
Pupils
per
Plan

Griggs
463
Southside 650

Class
Room
Grade Needs

5-6
1-4

18
26

A-24

Rms.
Sp. Ed. Needed
for ..'71 Plan and
Ch./ Sp. Ed. Rooms
Tchr.
'71
Avail.

+or-

17-2
0-0

+1
-11

20
26

21
15

Rooms
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APPENDIX II.

United States Court Of Appeals

Zone A presents no serious transportation problem. The distances are not great between the clustered
schools.

FIFTH CIRCUIT

Zone D

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Under Plan III, Zone D, White, Wilkerson Gardens
and Bungalow Road elementary schools are clustered.
The Zone embraces a rather small geographical area
and transportation distances are relatively short.
There is no indication of space problems resulting
from special education pupils.

May 2, 1972
TO ALL PARTIES LISTED BELOW
Re: No. 72-1211 -

Acree. et al vs. County Board of
Education of Richmond County
vs. Drummond, et al

Gentleman:
You are hereby advised that the Court has today
entered an order on behalf of Intervenors-AppelleesCross-Appellants denying the Petition ( ) for Rehearing in the above case. No opinion was rendered
in connection therewith. See Rule 41, Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure for issuance and stay of the
mandate.
Very truly yours,
EDWARD W. WADSWORTH,
Clerk
By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
DONNA BRADY
Deputy Clerk
/dlb
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The plan proposed for clustering of these three
elementary schools in Zone D is adopted and will be
implemented at the same time as Zone A, that is, on
or before February 14, 1972. The pupil population in
the four schools in Zone Das related to available space
will be approximately as is shown in the original plan.
It is iluustrated in the table below:

White
Wilkinson
Gardens
Bungalow
Road

Rins.
Sp. Ed. Needed
'71
Plan and
Class
Sp.Ed. Rooms Rooms•
Ch./
Room
'71
Needs Tchr.
Avail. + or-

Pupils
per
Plan

Grades

785

5-6

31

0-1

31**

31

0

576

1-2

23

0-1

23 **

24

+1

579

3-4

23 16-1

24
78

29

+5

84

The last column shows the number of rooms in excess (+) if
Plan III is implemented and if the special education population
as of the Fall of 1971 does not move. The minus sign indicates
room shortage.
00
1 assume that no classroom is needed since no grouping of special
education children is indicated for these schools.
0
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The Court leaves to the Board of Education ( or
Superintendent) the matter of determining whether
Houghton Elementary should or should not be closed.
If it is closed ( and the evidence satisfies the Court
that it is substandard) solution one which involves no
change from the Plan as originally presented as related to standard classrooms and grades seems preferable. If it should be determined not to close Houghton and if it should be included in Zone A along with
Telfair, Evans and Milledge, the following distribution of pupils is indicated by the Plan:
Evans

Telfair
Grade

6
7

B

Grade

99
87

3

245

186

169

43.1 %

39.5%

Houghton
Grade

4
5

w
121
126

Milledge
B

Grade

100
86

1
2

186
247
433

Totals
Percentage
of Blacks

w
153
154

B

91
91

307 182
489

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1179

ROBERT L. ACREE, et al.,
Plaintiffs

vs.
ANN GUNTER DRUMMOND, MASON CARTER
CLEMENTS, S. LEE WALLACE, NADINE
ESTROFF, DOUGLAS D. BARNARD, JR.,
ROBERT BEATTIE, BILL PERRY, DR. JAMES
B. HATTAWAY, WILLIAM J. SALLEY, PATRICK
G. SMITM, C. DAN COOK, EARL H. HENSLEY,
WILLIAM B. KUHLKE, JR., GEORGE H.
STREETER, GEORGE W. FISHER, FREDDIE
CHILDRESS, LEONA NORTON, H. WELDON
HAIR, HOWARD W. POTEET,
Plaintiffs in Intervention

vs.
COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
RICHMOND COUNTY, GEORGIA, ET AL.,
Defendants
ORDER

43.0%

Telfair
Rooms
Avail.
Rooms
Needed

B

67

431

Total
Percentage
of Blacks

Sp. Ed.

w
102

w
124
121

APPENDIX III.

Teach. - Child.

14

2

Evans
Teach. - Child.

6

6

37.2%

Houghton

Milledge

Teach. - Child. Teach. - Child.

0

0

0

0

19

23

22

31

19

18

17

20
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This case has been around since 1964. I came into
it in the Fall of 1968.
At that time a freedom of choice plan was in
effect in Richmond County schools. The total enrollment of white and black children in 1967-1968 was
A-7

approximately 35,750 students. Of 12,250 Negro students in the school population 5.5% chose to attend
previously all-white schools. With one exception no
white student had exercised freedom of choice to
attend a previously all-black school.
Judge Scarlett held hearings in the Spring of 1968
on a motion by plaintiffs to adjudge the School Board
in contempt and for summary judgment. He denied
such relief. On oppeal the Fifth Circuit reversed that
ruling. See 399 F.2d 151. The appellate court said:
"... we think it quite appropriate to point to the
fact on the undisputed statistics presented to us
it is clear that, with respect to the Richmond
County Board of Education, a plan of desegregating the schools, generally known as 'the freedom of choice' plan has not worked. It has not
produced a unitary school system in which there
are no longer Negro schools and white schools,
generally known and recognized by all as such.
Under these circumstances, it becomes the duty
of the respondent Board, not only under the Supreme Court decisions above referred to, but under our Jefferson decree, to take additional important and effective steps."
After the ruling was handed down the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals assigned the case to me. A hearing was held at Augusta in December, 1968. I said
that freedom of choice was impermissible. It had not
worked. The Supreme Court had made this clear in
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,
391 U.S. 430; 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed2d 716 where the
highest Court ruled that freedom of choice must be
an effective device promising "meaningful and immediate progress toward disestabilshing state-imposed segregation." The Court said that "The burden
A-8

Rms.

Telfair
Evans
Milledge

Pupils

Class

per
Plan

Room
Needs

431
433
658

Grade

6-7
4-5
1-3

17
17
26

Needed
Special Plan and Rooms

Ed. For Sp. Ed. Avail- Rooms
1971

'71

able

31-2
72-11
0-0

19
28

19
23
31

26

+I0
-5
+5

As appears in the above table, there is a shortage
of classrooms at Evans Elementary should no special
education children be moved from that school. There
are at least two solutions to this problem. Solution
one would require the movement of five special education classes from Evans to Milledge. Solution two
would call for movement of the fourth grade from
Evans to Milledge, that is to say, the fourth grade as
presented in the Munzer-Herman Plan III.
With respect to solution one, no change from Plan
III as originally presented is required other than the
movement of the special education children as referred
to above.
Under the second solution, the following attendance results would obtain:
Evans
Milledge
Telfair
B
w
B Grades
Grades
w
86
126
5
91
153
1
Same as in
154
91
2
original Plan
102
67
3
121 100
4

- - -530

Total

349
879

Percentage
of Blacks 38.5%
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Total

212

Percentage
of Blacks 40.6%

Houghton) and by Zone D (White, Wilkerson Gardens
and Bungalow Road elementary schools). I will comment subsequently on the closing of Houghton elementary.
Phase Two will be implemented on or before March
15, 1972. This Phase involves Zones E and I under
Plan III. The elementary schools affected are Jenkins
and Fleming which will be paired and Griggs and
Southside which will likewis.e be paired on or before
March 15th next.
Plan III as related to other elementary schools in
the system will be implemented on September 1, 1972.
Below is reviewed the effect of Plan III on the
elementary schools with special relation to pupil population and available classroom space.
PHASE ONE, PLAN III
ELEMENTARY, SCHOOLS
Zone A

At the .evidentiary hearing on December 16, 1971,
objections were raised by the Intervenors to the closing of Houghton elementary as proposed in each of
the four elementary plans involving Zone A. Opponents thereof did not believe that the three other elementary schools in the Zone (Evans, Telfair and Milledge) would he capable of housing both regular
classes and the special education classes, particularly
the special education pupils at Evans.
An analysis of pupil population and available space
in Zone A is set out below. It indicates that there is
adequate space at Telfair, Evans and Milledge for all
pupils, including special education children.

A-20

on a school board today is to come forward with a
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now."
I did not rule out freedom of choice altogether
but stated that I would "give consideration to a plan
formulated by the Board which combines automatic
assignment of pupils within designated g,eographical
zones and a limited freedom of choice of schools."
See Acree v. County Board of Education of Richmond
County, Georgia, 294 F. Supp. 1034. I directed that a
zone or attendance area system be put into effect for
the 1969-1970 school year.
On June 16, 1969, a hearing on the Board's plan
was held at Augusta. Plaintiffs objected to it in toto.
On July 14, 1969, I approved the plan presented as a
temporary expedient. See 301 F. Supp. 1285. I pointed
out:
"The decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit say that geographic zones are acceptable only if they tend to disestablish rather
than reinforce the dual system of segregated
schools. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners
of Mobile County, 393 F.2d 690; United States of
America v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School
District, 406 F.2d 1086 (Feb. 4, 1969); Henry v.
Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District,
409 F.2d 682. A school board must strive for promotion of desegregation and 'conscious effort
should he made to move bou:p.dary lines and change
feeder patterns which tend to preserve ·segregation.' See 393 F.2d at 694."
I further stated:
"I think the wisest thing to do at this time, certainly the most expedient, is to approve temporarily the Board's new zone system and permit
A-9

same to go into effect at the beginning of the
coming (1969-70) school year. We will soon thereafter be able to judge its effects. Because of possible constitutional infirmities of the zoning plan
it will not be permanent and this is not a final
order."
My Order of July 16, 1969, directed the School
Board and Superintendent to apply immediately to
the Office of Education, H.E. W., for professional
counselling and assistance looking to development of
a satisfactory and legal plan at an early date.
Before such a plan could be developed and presented the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. This was in March,
1970. On July 1st of that year that Court remanded
the case. See 443 F.2d 1360. The higher Court said:
"Having examined the record and the briefs of
counsel in the above styled and numbered cause,
this Court is left with a very definite and indelible
impression - the Richmond County, Georgia public schools are racially identifiable, both as to the
faculty and the composition of the respective student bodies. If there is any hope remaining for
the Richmond County public schools to operate
as a unitary system by the commencement of the
new school year - prompt and immediate action
is required."
In compliance with the Order by the Fifth Circuit
a hearing was held and evidence introduced on July
30, 1970. On August 3rd I approved a plan recommended by Health, Education and Welfare which I
modified to include additional pairing. It was essentially a neighborhood plan. The Fifth Circuit had g,one
along with something similar in the case of Ellis v.
Board of Public Instruction of Orange County,
A-10

with. To obviate the system being closed down indefinitely I permitted the carrying on of a dual system
at the beginning of the year. It is still in effect.
Last June I handed down an Order which fully
integ;rated the secondary schools in the Chatham
County system (with one necessary exception.). I delayed action on the elementary level as the Board
wished more time and had not been able to agree on
a plan. My decision was appealed and the ruling reversed. This Court was instructed to "forthwith" desegregate the elementary as well as secondary schools.
This was done by the Court early in September, 1971.
The situation in the Chatham County school case differs only from the Richmond County case in that the
former involved the beginning of a school year and
the latter the middle of such a year.
I realize that February is a poor time to revolutionize a school system. Significant educational problems are especially involved in massive changes in
student populations of senior high schools during the
academic year. Student schedules have already been
planned for the year. Athletic programs have been
developed and implemented. Seniors have spent one
half of the year in present locations and have planned
senior year activities, including ordering rings and
yearbooks.
But a start must be and will be made. It will commence with certain elementary schools and will beeff ectuated in three phases. Phase One of Plan III proposed by the Court's experts will be implemented not
later than February 15, 1972. The initial implementation will apply to two clusters of elementary schools
represented by Zone A (Telfair, Evans, Milledge and
A-19

buses would be required at a cost of $12,400 each with
an annual operational cost of $5,000 per bus. 4 Under
Plan III, 5,681 additional elementary students would
be transported. On the secondary level, Plan I contemplates bussing of 1,644 additional high school and
junior high students. Plan II (secondary) calls for the
transportation of 2,150 more students than are now
being bussed. The estimates of increased transportation needs are possibly over-estimated by Dr. Munzer
and Mr. Herman.
Counsel requested the Court to delay implementation of any plan pending discussions among the
parties as to devising one (particularly on the secondary school level) which would be satisfactory. I
granted a twenty-day .extension for that purpose. That
period has passed without any agreement being reached. Of course, in any event, the parties would not be
permitted to stipulate away the mandate of the Constitution as to establishment of a unitary school system - one in which there are neither white nor black
schools, just schools.
On July 1, 1971, the Fifth Circuit ordered that
this Court require the Richmond County School Board
"forthwith" to constitute and implement a constitutional student assignment plan. That means now, at
once, without delay or interval. Because of the Board's
wilful failure to carry out its constitutional duty the
mandate of the higher Court could not be complied
4

The same objection as to cost of increased transportation was
made in the Savannah case. With staggered bus schedules, the
increased needs have been handled (though with difficulty) by
the existing equipment. The Chatham County system has approximately the same number of buses as Richmond County and
about the same enrollment.
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Florida, 423 F.2d 203. I took that route. The plan in
question was to be implemented at the 1970-1971
school year.

My Order of August 3, 1970, in the Acree case
was appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Meanwhile, the
"busing" and racial ratio cases, including Swann v.
Charlotte - Mecklenburg Board of Education had
reached the Supreme Court of the United States. The
Court of Appeals held its ruling in abeyance pending
a decision in Swann and the other cases. It was handed
down by the Supreme Court on April 20, 1971. See
402 U.S. 1-48. That decision made it clear (I quote the
syllabus in Swann) that:
(a) While the existence of a small number of
one-race, or virtually one-race, schools does not in itself denote a system that still practices segregation
by law, the court should scrutinize such schools and
require the school authorities to satisfy the court that
the racial composition does not result from present
or past discriminatory action on their part.1
(b) A student assignment plan is not acceptable
merely because it appears to be neutral, for such a
plan may fail to counteract the continuing effects of
past school segregation. The pairing and grouping of
noncontiguous zones is a permissible tool.
( c) The District Court's conclusion that assignment of children to the school nearest their home serving their grade would not effectively dismantle the
dual system is supported by the record, and the reme1

The Fifth Circuit has been telling us for years that "If in a school
district there are still all-Negro schools or only a small fraction
of Negroes enrolled in white schools ... then as a matter of law
the existing plan fails to meet constitutional standards established
in Green." Adams v. Mathews, 403 F.2d 181.
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dial technique of requiring bus transportation as a
tool of school desegregation was within that court's
power to provide equitable relief.
On July 1, 1971, the Court of Appeals for this
Circuit disapproved the plan which this Court had
approved in July, 1970, to be put into effect during
the current school year. It remanded the case, stating:
"The judgment of the district court as it relates
to student and faculty assignment is vacated and
the case is remanded with direction that the district court require the school board forthwith to
constitute and implement a student and faculty
assignment plan that complies with the principles
established in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 1971, __ U.S. - -, __
_
S.Ct. _
_
L.Ed.2d_ , 39 Law Week
4437; Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School
Board, 5 Cir., 1970, 432 F.2d 875, and Singleton v.
Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 5 Cir.,
1970, 419 F.2d 1211, insofar as they relate to the
issues presented in this case."
The Court of Appeals has said that the prevailing
system is a dual and an unconstitutional one. The racial statistics bear this out beyond all doubt. They
reveal that in the elmentary schools during the 19701971 year seventeen were predominantly white and
nine predominantly black. 2 There were four all-black
elementary schools and one all-white. In eleven elementary schools the minority attendance was 5% or
less of the whole and in three other schools the
minority ratio was 10% or less of the entire school
population .. 3 On the secondary school level in 19702
3

I have used an 85% ratio as illustrating a predominantly white
or predominantly black school.
For example, at Southside this year there are 680 students of
whom 8 are black.
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At my suggestion, the Intervenors presented a
plan for consideration. It is entitled "Quality Education Plan for the People of Richmond County, Georgia." The plan is nothing more than Freedom of Choice
both for students and faculty. Since the Intervenors
have a right of appeal from this Order the higher
court can enlighten us as to my evaluation of the
"plan" proposed. Anyone who has even casually examined the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals for this Circuit
must know that choice plans are not constitutionally
acceptable in a case such as this. In fact, the latter
Court said exactly as much concerning the Richmond
County system. See 399 F.2d 152.
On October 8, 1971, Dr. Munzer and Mr. Herman
returned to Augusta to confer with the Court concerning the proposed desegregation plans. On the same
day, with counsel and the Superintendent of Schools
present, the plans were explained and discussed by the
experts in the courtroom.
A full evidentiary hearing was held on December
16-17, 1971, for the purpose of considering a plan and
for hearing evidence which the Intervenors desired to
offer in opposition thereto. Witnesses for the Intervenors testified as to the effect of the Munzer-Herman
plans on the R.O.T.C. program and on the exceptional
children and model reading programs. The Director
of Transportation stated that the Richmond County
school system has 97 buses, including four assigned
to special education. Eighty-three operate daily and
there are 10 spare buses. In the last school year more
than 12,000 students of a total of 34,619 were bussed.
It was estimated that under the proposed plan 27 new
A-17

and Johnson has 442 students, 39% black. The basic
difference in the two secondary school Plans is that
Plan I does not involve Sandbar Ferry or Sego
whereas under Plan II these two schools are paired in
such a way that Sandbar Ferry is grade 8 and Sego
is grade 9.
After the plans were filed, I asked the parties for
their analysis, comments and criticisms. The plaintiffs
complained, among other thing,s, that presently allblack Laney and Josey were reduced in status from
graduating high schools and that this was not done
in the case of any predominantly white senior high
school.
The Board's response was of expected quality and
content. It raises every carping, contumacious objection conceivable. It is a mishmash and embranglement
of letters from individual members of the Board, the
Superintendent and principals opposing desegregation
of the system. There are resolutions, letters, speeches,
newspaper clippings, et cetera. The response contributes less than nothing to the difficult problem the
Board faced but fled.

1971, out of seventeen schools there was one all-black
and two 99% black schools. There were six predominantly white schools in which the Negro ratio was less
than 10% and two predominantly black schools with
an attendance by white students of 6% or less. Two
other secondary schools had a white ratio of 88% of
the school population.
The current school year has produced inevitably
(since the same plan is in effect) the same segregated
picture. The projected attendance indicated that there
are forty-one schools in which white students predominate. They have a total enrollment of 24,721 of
whom 20,648 are white and 4,073 are black. In eighteen
black schools in the system which have a total enrollment of 12,941 there are 360 white students (2.8%).
Following the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals on July 1, 1971, I promptly ordered the Board
to present a student and faculty assignment plan to
this Court not later than July 21, 1971. I assigned a
hearing on it for July 28th. Subsequently, upon oral
request I extended to August 26th the time for presentation of such a plan. A hearing was held on that
date.

Meanwhile, in October, 1971, I permitted a group
of white parents to intervene who are opposed to busing, though they say they are not opposed to integration per se. I will add that if there is any way to dismantle a dual school system, and the Richmond County
Board perpetuated one long after the 1954 decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, I am
not aware how the constitutional imperative can ever
be achieved without substantially increasing the transportation of students.

To my amazement, the H.E.W. officials did not
show up at the August 26, 1971, hearing. Without
notice or excuse and at whose behest I do not know
they did a disappearing act. The Board's behavior was
no less contemptible. They passed the buck to the
Superintendent of Schools, who, no doubt under instructions, presented a "plan" to the Court on behalf
of the Board. What that individual did recommend
does not surprise me in the light of his statement to
this Court at the hearing held in Augusta on Decem-
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ber 16, 1971. I inquired of him what plan he would
sugg.est to the Court for the integration of the school
system and his reply was, "Freedom of Choice." The
plan presented by the School Superintendent at the
"hearing" on August 26th last was to keep the school
zones as they were except for two or three minor
changes as to boundaries. One of them would have
transferred about 100 white students to an all-black
high school. This plan, so learned counsel for the
Board informed me, made the system a unitary one,
if it was not already such.
In Acree v. County Board of Education of Richmond County, 399 F.2d 151, the Court of Appeals said:
"We think it not necessary to do more than call the
attention of the respondent here to the extremely important obligation which is once more placed on the
Board to assume its full responsibility to do all that
is reasonably feasible, and now, to bring an end to the
dual system of white and Negro schools in Richmond
County." The Richmond County Board and its Superintendent have abdicated their responsibility. They
have been contemptuous and intransigent. They have
chosen to ignore the Constitution and the courts. Apparently, they, together with a segment of the population of Richmond County, deem themselves above
and beyond the law. The Fourteenth Amendment is
not to apply to those who find it not to their liking.

gation planning, Dr. J. Howard Munzer and Myrl G.
Herman of the faculty of Rhode Island College.
Alternative plans were presented in the MunzerHerman suggestions which were filed in this Court on
September 27, 1971. The several Plans do not set out
to establish any set numerical r atio of blacks to whites.
However, through clustering and pairing it achieves
a not dissimilar result.
Four elementary school plans are proposed. Plan I
involves an unecceptable minimum amount of integration. Plan II involves more desegregation and Plan III
(which I am adopting) even more. Plan IV would
provide for maximum desegregation embraced and
involved all but two elementary schools.
Two plans were presented for desegregation of
the secondary schools. The plan is the same for the
following schools: Josey, Murphey, Butler, Tutt,
Langford, Richmond Academy and Laney. Under both
Plan I and Plan II at the secondary level the schools
mentioned would house the following grades.
Josey - Grades 8-9
Murphey - Grade 10
Butler - Grades 11-12
Tutt - Grades 8-9
Langford - Grades 8-9
Richmond Academy - Grades 11-12
Laney - Grade 10

At the conclusion of the August hearing I stated
that this Court would employ its own .e xperts at the
Board's expense to do what it and the school officials
refused to do in the way of devising a plan of desegregation. Five days later the Court obtained the services
of two well-known educators, experienced in desegre-

In both Plan I and Plan II Tubman will house
grade 8 and Johnson grade 9. However, under Plan I
Tubman would have 511 students, 50% black, and
Johnson would have 492 students, 45 % black, whereas
under Plan II Tubman has 461 students, 45% black,
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No. A-250
Drummond, et al.
Reapplication For Stay

v.

Acree, et al.
August

, 1972

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, Circuit Justice.
This application, filed by parent-intervenors in

~

school desegregation case-from Richmond

this

County (Augusta), Georgia, seeks a stay of a judgment
of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

That

court, on March 31, 1972, affirmed an order of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
adoP.tin&
Georgia Hffelliii a plan for the desegregation of 29
elementary schools in Augusta.

Acree v. County Board

of Education of Richmond County, 458 F .2d 486 (1972).
On two previous occasions, I have denied stay application
in this case.

- 2>

On February//, 1972 I refused to stay

the District Court's order pending appeal to the Fifth

~c~

After the Fifth Circuit's affirmance, I
en.·
5"affie1'""
........t·Jes ,,_.

[ agai!}] denied
11,.4-~

~

cJ.

,,.. '6 lJ e ('/
becauseJ\.R8 st:ay had~ been i&tJE§ht from the appropriate

Court of Appeals as required by Rule 27 of the Supreme
Court Rules.

Applicants immediately sought a stay

~

~ ~~/_I

from the Fifth Circuit...,~at stay having oaw been
~

- ,1.,,. .. • ,..f'h Applicants have reapplied to me.
I\

-

;)_-

This reapplication is premised solely on the
contention that a stay is required under section
803 of the Education Amerrtlments of 1972.

That

sectiorf. appro•1ed by Gont;,ress en Jt1fle 23, t9n::\S-

-

reads in pertinent part as follows,
"in the case of any order on the part of any
United States District Court which requires the
transfer or transportation of any student • • •
for the purpose1 of achieving a balance among
students with respect to race • • • , the
effectiveness of such order shall be postponed
until all appeals • • • have been exhausted
• • • •

II

Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, § 803
(June 23, 1972)(emphasis added).I

By its terms, the

statute requires that the effectiveness of a District
Court order be postponed pending appeal only if the
order requires the"transfer or transportation" of
students "for the purposet of achieving a balance
among students with respect to race."
, . .J

I

J

It does not

•

/}

~
/,µ

'

~ ~~ ~ ~~~bf

purport to block all desegregation orders.I\

Jif Congress

had desired to stay all such orders it could have used
~~J½C-~

A language appropriate to that result.

..Inseeei; in the..

~eg,ign •-Odiate]y precedje~ sootica 809, Q1agzqa,

""4ewanstrated

':fj

88

s•e•••s

j

tw aei? j ty to spsih mu1111 kmoadJ Jr x±ar

.., J,,J,

,~e,e./e,

•'le...

,ee.f-1n, 1031
In section 802(a) Congress prohibited the

'"

use of federal funds to aid in any program for the
transportation of students if the design of the

k

-

--3-\ f'J/'

to/

program is to "overcome racial imbalance" ~ a r r y
out a plan of desegregation." Education Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. 92-318,

i

802(a) (June 23, 1972) (emphasis
Congress

added).

be
intended section 803 to fjff#i#significantly narrower
in scope than section 802(a).

/

Fl:!rt:hermere~, i n light of this Court's holding
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971), it could hardly be contended that
Congress was unaware of the legal significance of
its "racial balance" language.

In that case the school

authorities argued that section 407(a) of the Civil
J'I.>.

u,s.c. .,- .;,ooo,- ~.)

Rights Act of 1964 restricted the power of federal
I\

courts in prescribing a method for correcting stateimposed segregation.

'{ec+io,,.

The Chief Justice's interpretation

'IO 7(0)/

s

ofbat see,t.i.oR'(" which appliesf' only to orders "seeking
0.,

to achieve racial balance " is controlling here 1
A

I\

"The proviso in (§ 407(ar.J is in terms designed to
foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding
the existing powers of federal courts to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause. There is no suggestion
of an intention to restrict those powers or
withdraw from the courts their historic equitable
remedial powers." 'f()"J_ U. !, o.-f 11[e~ptior, ;,.. or''11~a/),,
an

ge already given an

-----

by the Supreme Court, ~

,+,$

must be presumed to have intended that e:hciJ

Rider A, p. 3
It is clear from the juxtaposition and the language
of these two sections that Congress intended to proscribe the
use of Federal funds for the busing of students under any
desegregation plan but limited the stay provisions of
Section 803 to desegregation plans which seek to achieve
r acial balance.
V

in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education ,
402 U.S. 1 (1971), it could hardly be contended that
Congress was unaware of the legal significance of
its "racial balance" language .

In that case the school

authorities argued that sect ion 407(a) of the Civil
>"'~ u,!.c. '5' .;,ooo,- 6_,
Rights Act of 1964 restricted the power of federal
/\

courts in prescribing a method for correcting stateimposed segregation .

The Chief Justice ' s interpretation

'{ec +io.., t/D 7(0)/
$
ofbat sectioa'("" which applies( only to orders "seeking
0..,

to achieve racial balance " is controlling here 1

"

"

"The proviso in [§ 407(a !J is in terms designed to
foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding
the existing powers of federal courts to enforce
the Equal Protection Clluse. There is no suggestion
of an intention to ra strict those powers or
withdraw from the courts their historic equitable
remedial powers." '(O'J... U. !. o.+ 11['e,,,pliori" ;,, or'111~a/)_
an

~e already given an
Court,

&:f-L

i+s

must be presumed to have intended that elmis
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words receive the same interpretation.
The
the lower court order in this case was for the purpose
of achieving a racial balance.

~

This question was resolved

~ ~ t : J_j~

Aby the Court of . Appeals.

Applicants cLaimed

on their

appeal that the District Court order called for forced
busing to "achieve racial balance."

458 F. 2d at 487.

The court rejected that contention, citing the holding
lrn.Jz,;

in Swann that bus transportation is
'

~

ng school desegregatio~
A _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

~

l>--j H...-t...-

ai.i:;L---ct¥lr.·1::-±1Ett)±e-t:~

r N; thing ~n the

District Court's opinion or final order, nor anything

2/

in the history of this protracted litigation,

indicates

that the court departed from the requirements and

Since the court order was not entered for the
purpose of "achieving a balance among students with
respect to race" in the Augusta elementary schools t
section 803 does not apply.

This stay application

must, therefore, be denied.
It is so ordered.
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words receive the same interpretation.
The
the lower court order in this case was for the purpose
of achieving a racial balance.
u-- } 4 ~ , c , !_j~
Aby the Court o f. Appeals .

This question was resolved

Applicants c~aimed

on their

appeal that the District Court order called for forced
busing to "achieve racial balance . "

458 F.2d at 487.

The court rejected that contention , citing the holding
t:rn.L l>--j ~
a.o-atV--F-.H·c:-±1~tc-e--f:n

in Swann that bus transportation is

•
~

ngschool desegregatio ~

A

~~thing ·in the

Rider

4i

A, p. 4

For the purpose of acting on this application,

I accept the holdings of the courts below that the order
·fv

was enteredJ f o r

~ ~~ ~

f desegregating a sc?ool system

in accordance with the mandate of Swann and not for the

purpose of achieving racial balance.

must, theretore, be denied.
It is so ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1/

A stay has also been denied by the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
on August 18, 1972 •

. .JJ

For a complete history of this litigation see the

most recent opinion of the District Court.
Drummond, 336 F. Supp. 1275 (1972).

Acree v,

•- ,...., """

-

Dra f t

as dictated on phone by Larry

8/31/72

~'(

P 3
In short, as used in Section 407a the phrase
"achieving racial balance" was used in the context of
eliminating de facto segregation.

The Court went on to caution lower federal
courts that, in the exercise of their broad remedial
powers, their focus must be on dismantling dual school
systems rather than on achieving perfect racial balance:
"The constitutional command to desegregate schools does
not mean that every school in every community must always
reflect the racial composition of the school system as

' \:[§

a whole.fl This was said not in condemnation of existing
techniques but in disapproval of _pl,,,e wooden resort to
racial quotas or racial balance.

Nothing in the instant

statute or in the legislative history suggests that
Congress used these words in a new and broader sense.

~'

,...

At most Congress may have intended to postpone the
effectiveness of transportation orders in "de facto"
cases and in cases in which district court judges have
misused their remedial powers.
The question, therefore, must be whether the
lower court order in this case was for the purpose of
achieving racial balance as that phrase was used in

Swann.

